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ARTICLES
“ALL AREAS OF SUSPECTED DISABILITY”
Mark C. Weber*
ABSTRACT
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)
requires school districts to assess children “in all areas of
suspected disability.”
It further provides that each child’s
individualized education program (IEP) must contain measurable
annual goals designed to “meet each of the child’s . . . educational
needs that result from the child’s disability,” and a statement of
special education and related services that will be provided for the
child “to advance appropriately toward attaining annual goals.”
Courts have strictly enforced these requirements in the last
several years, remedying violations of IDEA when school districts
fail to assess in all areas of suspected disability or do not establish
goals and services to meet each of the child’s needs resulting from
the disability. This Article offers three interpretations of this
recent development. First, what the courts are doing may
represent an effort to enforce provisions of IDEA that stand apart
from the limited reading that a 1982 Supreme Court case placed
on the requirement in the statute to provide a free, appropriate
public education. Second, the development may signify a different
way of looking at special education obligations under the law, one
well adapted to the ever-increasing importance attached to
providing services in settings that maximize the inclusion of
students with disabilities with nondisabled students. Third, the
cases might simply be a reaction to cutbacks on evaluations and
services that school districts have imposed because of financial
strains brought about by the Great Recession. This Article will
not try to declare which of these interpretations is the correct one,
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and in fact all three may be true. But the Article will conclude that
enforcement of these provisions furthers the underlying purposes
Congress had in enacting IDEA.
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“ALL AREAS OF SUSPECTED DISABILITY”
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)
requires school districts to assess children “in all areas of
suspected disability.” 1 It further provides that each child’s
individualized education program (IEP) must contain measurable
annual goals designed to “meet each of the child’s . . . educational
needs that result from the child’s disability,” 2 and a statement of
special education and related services that will be provided for
the child “to advance appropriately toward attaining the annual

1. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(3)(B) (2006).
2. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(II)(bb).
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goals.” 3
This Article observes that courts have rigorously enforced
these requirements in recent years, finding violations of IDEA
when school districts fail to assess in all areas of suspected
disability or do not establish goals and services to meet each of
the child’s needs resulting from the disability. The Article tries to
put this case law development into perspective by offering three
interpretations. First, what the courts are doing may represent
an effort to enforce provisions of IDEA that stand apart from the
limited reading that a 1982 Supreme Court case placed on the
requirement in the statute to provide a free, appropriate public
education. 4 Under a second interpretation, the development may
signify a different way of looking at special education obligations,
one well adapted to the ever-increasing importance attached to
providing services in settings that maximize the inclusion of
students with disabilities with nondisabled students. 5 As a third
way of looking at the development, the cases might simply be a
reaction to cutbacks on evaluations and services that school
districts have imposed because of financial strains brought about
by the Great Recession.
This Article will not try to determine which of these
interpretations is the correct one, and all three may be true. But
the Article will conclude that emphasis on the all areas and each
need provisions has provided many parents with the ability to
prevail in disputes over educational programs that might
otherwise offer their children less than fully adequate services, or
services not well adapted to success in mainstream settings.
Enforcement of these provisions therefore furthers the underlying
purposes Congress had in enacting IDEA.
The all areas and each need provisions have so far received
little attention in the legal literature. Scholars have devoted
much thought to the issue of appropriate education for children
with disabilities and the long career of the first and only case the
Supreme Court decided on the issue many years ago. 6 Recently,
3. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(IV)(aa).
4. See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 203-04 (1982) (discussed infra notes
22-27).
5. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5) (2006).
6. See infra note 83 and accompanying text. Numerous early articles criticize
the Rowley decision. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, The Role of Cost in Educational
Decisionmaking for the Handicapped Child, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1985,
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significant writing has appeared on the topic of eligibility for
services under IDEA. 7 But insufficient attention has been paid to
the all areas and each need provisions—which were incorporated
into the law after the Supreme Court spoke—and only a limited
number of scholars have assessed the impact of these evaluation
and IEP requirements on the nature of the services children are
entitled to receive. 8 This Article begins the task of gathering and
interpreting the extensive recent case law on the all areas and
each need requirements.
Section I of this Article will lay out the basic entitlements,
procedures, and standards that IDEA creates. Section II will
discuss the text and context of the all areas and each need
provisions. Section III will describe the recent case law enforcing
the obligations that the provisions establish. Then Section IV
will consider three explanations for the recent judicial attention
to the provisions: (1) a way of enforcing IDEA obligations that
does not depend on interpretations of appropriate education
derived from the single Supreme Court case on the subject but
instead on evaluation and IEP provisions added to the law after
at 7, 43-49, 55, 61; John E.B. Myers & William R. Jenson, The Meaning of
“Appropriate” Educational Programming Under the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act, 9 S. ILL. U. L.J. 401, 411-16, 427-41 (1984); Bonnie Poitras Tucker,
Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley: Utter
Chaos, 12 J.L. & EDUC. 235 passim (1983); Patricia L. Arcuri, Case Comment, 14
RUTGERS L.J. 989, 997-1010 (1983); Margaret Corning Boldrick, Casenote, 14 ST.
MARY’S L.J. 425, 438-42 (1983). More recent critical commentary includes: Joyce O.
Eckrem & Eliza J. McArthur, Is the Rowley Standard Dead? From Access to Results,
5 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 199, 204-07, 213-17 (2001); Chad Hinson, Note, A
Supreme Paradox: Autism Spectrum Disorder and Rowley Misapplication of a
Judicial Relic to an Unprecedented Social Epidemic, 5 FLA. A & M U. L. REV. 87
passim (2009); Jonathan Stead, Note, Toward True Equality of Educational
Opportunity: Unlocking the Potential of Assistive Technology Through Professional
Development, 35 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 224, 233-35 (2009). More recent
studies of Rowley and the case law on appropriate education include: Julie F. Mead &
Mark A. Paige, Board of Education of Hendrick Hudson v. Rowley: An Examination
of Its Precedential Impact, 37 J.L. & EDUC. 329 (2008); Ronald D. Wenkart, The
Rowley Standard: A Circuit by Circuit Review of How Rowley Has Been Interpreted,
247 ED. LAW REP. 1 (2009); Scott Goldschmidt, Comment, A New Idea for SpecialEducation Law: Resolving the “Appropriate” Educational Benefit Circuit Split and
Ensuring a Meaningful Education for Students with Disabilities, 60 CATH. U. L. REV.
749 (2011). See generally Amy June Rowley, Rowley Revisited: A Personal Narrative,
37 J.L. & EDUC. 311 (2008) (providing personal narrative of background and
consequences of case).
7. See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
8. Several exceptions to this generalization are discussed infra notes 33, 40, and
43.
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the Supreme Court spoke; (2) an approach to education of
children with disabilities that is most consistent with inclusion;
and (3) a parental and judicial reaction to school district cuts in
services due to budgetary shortfalls.
I. IDEA ENTITLEMENTS, PROCEDURES, AND
STANDARDS
IDEA provides federal special education funding to states
and school districts that agree to obey its requirements. 9 The
states and school districts must provide free, appropriate public
education to all children with disabilities, 10 a duty that includes
furnishing related services, 11 such as speech-language pathology
and audiology services, physical and occupational therapy,
recreation, social work services, school nurse services, counseling,
and other activities that may assist the child to benefit from
special education. 12 The statute further requires that children
with disabilities be educated, “[t]o the maximum extent
appropriate,” with children who are not disabled, and that
removal from general education occur only when the child’s
education “cannot be achieved satisfactorily” in general education
classes with the use of supplementary aids and services. 13
After a child is referred for special education by a parent or
teacher, the school district must assess the child, determine
whether the child is eligible under IDEA as a child with a
disability, write an individualized education program for the
child, and provide a placement for the child in a setting in which
needed services can be delivered. 14 The IEP is a single document
that spells out the child’s entire educational arrangement,
including goals to be met, services to be offered, and measures to
assess progress towards the goals. 15 If the parent disagrees with
what the school district offers, the parent may request a due
9. See 20 U.S.C. § 1411 (2006) (authorizing allocations to states and
appropriations).
10. Id. § 1412(a)(1).
11. Id. § 1401(9).
12. Id. § 1401(26)(A).
13. Id. § 1412(a)(5)(A).
14. MARK C. WEBER ET AL., SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 204
(3d ed. 2010) (detailing basic special education process); see 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)-(d)
(2006) (specifying legal requirements for identification, evaluation, creation of IEP,
and implementation).
15. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A) (2006).
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process hearing, and in some states, the school district or the
parent who loses at the hearing may obtain an administrative
review. 16 Any party to the administrative proceedings who
remains aggrieved can file an appeal in court. 17 Hearing officers
and courts may make orders for future placements and services,
and may award tuition reimbursement, 18 compensatory
education, 19 and other appropriate remedies. 20 Courts may
award attorneys’ fees to prevailing parents, or, if the parents
pursue a frivolous due process proceeding, to a prevailing school
district. 21
In Board of Education v. Rowley, 22 a 1982 case rejecting a
claim that a school district needed to provide a sign language
interpreter for a child with a severe hearing impairment who was
already receiving an FM hearing aid and had excellent lipreading skills, the Supreme Court interpreted the appropriate
education term of the statute as requiring a “basic floor of
opportunity,” an education that would “confer some educational
The Court rejected a proposed definition of
benefit.” 23
appropriate education that would require services to maximize
the child’s potential commensurate with the opportunities
provided other children. 24 Though the Court cautioned that it
was “not attempt[ing] to establish any one test for determining
the adequacy of educational benefits conferred upon all children
covered by the Act,” 25 lower courts have applied the case’s
standard to a vast range of disputes over the adequacy of services
offered to children with disabilities. 26 Various authorities have
discussed whether subsequent legislative and judicial
16. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)-(g).
17. Id. § 1415(i)(2).
18. Id. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii)-(iv); see Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230,
247 (2009) (recognizing general right of reimbursement under IDEA when school
district fails to offer appropriate education to child, and parent unilaterally places
child privately in appropriate placement) .
19. E.g., Draper v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 518 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2008).
20. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) (2006) (“grant such relief as the court
determines is appropriate”).
21. Id. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i).
22. 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
23. Id. at 200.
24. Id. at 198.
25. Id. at 202.
26. See WEBER ET AL., supra note 14, at 32 (noting that lower courts had fully
discussed Rowley in more than 750 cases as of 2010).
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developments have effectively limited Rowley, 27 but the Supreme
Court has not considered whether Rowley has been superseded in
any way, for the Court has not taken a case on the definition of
appropriate education in the last thirty-one years.
II. EVALUATION IN ALL AREAS AND GOALS AND
SERVICES TO MEET ALL NEEDS
IDEA’s provisions mandating assessment of children in all
areas of suspected disability and services to meet each need fit,
respectively, into the contexts of a set of evaluation requirements
and a set of IEP requirements. Both provisions share roots in a
1997 revision to IDEA, though the assessment provision has a
longer history tracing to the first set of regulations promulgated
under the law that is now IDEA.
A. ASSESSMENT IN “ALL AREAS OF SUSPECTED DISABILITY”:
As noted at the outset of this Article, IDEA requires school
districts to assess children “in all areas of suspected disability.” 28
This mandate is part of a whole group of requirements pertaining
to evaluation. Evaluation must take place before the initiation of
special education services for a child, 29 and reevaluation must
take place at least once every three years, unless the parent and
school district agree that a reevaluation is not needed. 30 When
conducting an evaluation, the school district must use a variety of
assessment tools and strategies, must not use any single measure
or assessment as the sole criterion for determining eligibility or
programming for a child, and must use technically sound
instruments. 31 The school district must be sure that assessments
and evaluation materials are selected and administered so as not
to be racially or culturally discriminatory, administered in the
child’s own language, used for the purposes for which the
assessments are valid and reliable, administered by trained and
27. Compare Deal v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 392 F.3d 840, 864 (6th Cir.
2004) (stating that current version of IDEA evidences congressional intent to require
programs requiring meaningful educational benefit toward self-sufficiency goal), with
J.L. v. Mercer Island Sch. Dist., 592 F.3d 938, 951 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that
current version of IDEA does not supersede Rowley appropriate education standard).
See generally Goldschmidt, supra note 6 (describing contrasting treatment of Rowley
standard in federal courts).
28. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(3)(B) (2006).
29. Id. § 1414(a)(1)(A).
30. Id. § 1414(a)(2)(B)(ii).
31. Id. § 1414(b)(2).
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knowledgeable personnel, and administered according to the
authors’ instructions. 32 Commentators have stressed how critical
it is for children to have a thorough assessment of their
disabilities. 33
The importance that the United States Department of
Education attaches to accurate evaluation is underscored by the
Department’s longstanding regulation providing that parents who
disagree with the school district’s evaluation may obtain an
If the parent
independent evaluation at public expense. 34
requests an independent evaluation, it is up to the school district
either to file a due process complaint to show that its evaluation
is appropriate, or to make sure that the independent evaluation is
provided. 35 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
recently held that the regulation was a valid use of the
Department’s regulatory authority36 despite the absence of any
statutory command that independent evaluations be free of
32. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(3)(A). Still more requirements apply to evaluation for
specific learning disability, see 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(6) (2006); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.307.311(2013), a topic that has generated significant controversy in recent years with
discontent over IQ-based testing and the emergence of Response-to-Intervention
(RTI) methodology, see Mark C. Weber, The IDEA Eligibility Mess, 57 BUFF. L. REV.
83, 122-43 (2009) (describing controversy over evaluation for specific learning
disability and development of RTI techniques) (collecting sources).
33. See, e.g., Elisa Hyman et al., How IDEA Fails Families Without Means:
Causes and Corrections from the Frontlines of Special Education Lawyering, 20 AM.
U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 107, 115 (2011) (“[I]n some districts, children do not
receive thorough and adequate evaluations, and district employees are bound by
blanket policies and even moratoria. Thus, the entire process breaks down. Poor
families suffer most from this phenomenon.”) (footnotes omitted); Terry Jean
Seligmann, Sliding Doors: The Rowley Decision, Interpretation of Special Education
Law, and What Might Have Been, 41 J.L. & EDUC. 71, 79 (2012) (“There are few
disputes over special education services that can be resolved without the aid of
expert evaluations.”); Sanu Dev, Note, Implications of the Parental Right to
Unilaterally Revoke Consent of Services on the Rights of a Child with Learning
Disabilities Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 8 RUTGERS J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 745, 772-73 (2011) (“If students have a right to a minimally adequate
education, then all students, including those who were formally characterized as
students with disabilities, should be entitled to an evaluation to determine the most
appropriate alternative education program to ensure that they continue to receive an
education.”).
34. 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b) (2013).
35. Id. §300.502(b)(2). See generally Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. B.S., 82 F.3d 1493
(9th Cir. 1996) (ordering school district to pay for independent evaluation when
district’s assessment team failed to include anyone with knowledge of disorders
affecting child).
36. Phillip C. v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 701 F.3d 691, 693 (11th Cir. 2012),
petition for cert. filed, 81 U.S.L.W. 3620 (U.S. Apr. 16, 2013) (No. 12-1252).
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charge. 37
B. GOALS AND SERVICES TO MEET EACH OF THE CHILD’S
EDUCATIONAL NEEDS
IDEA requires that each IEP must contain measurable
annual goals designed to “meet each of the child’s . . . educational
needs that result from the child’s disability,” 38 and that the IEP
must include a statement of special education and related
services that will be provided for the child “to advance
appropriately toward attaining the annual goals.” 39 Thus the IEP
has to have goals and services that address each of the needs
identified by the assessment in all areas of disability. 40
This requirement is part of an array of statutory definitions
and dictates that concern IEPs. The IEP must contain a
statement of the child’s present levels of academic achievement
and functional performance; a statement of measurable annual
goals; a description of how the child’s progress toward meeting
the goals will be measured; a statement of the special education
and related services and supplementary services to be provided
the child and program modifications and supports; an explanation
of the extent to which the child will not be participating with
nondisabled children in general education classes; a listing of
accommodations on state and district assessments; a statement of
dates to begin services and their frequency, location, and
duration; and a specification of goals and services for postsecondary transition if the child is sixteen or older. 41 The team
that discusses and writes up the IEP must include the parents of
the child, a general education teacher if the child is or might be
participating in the general education environment, a special
education teacher, a representative of the school district with
37. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1) (2006) (providing for independent evaluations
without stating they must be free).
38. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(II).
39. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(IV)(aa).
40. See Allan G. Osborne, Jr., Are School Districts Required to Identify Placement
Locations for the Delivery of Services in Proposed IEPs?, 261 ED. LAW REP. 497, 505
(2010) (“Chosen placements must meet all of a student’s needs.”); Gabriela Brizuela,
Note, Making an “IDEA” a Reality: Providing a Free And Appropriate Public
Education for Children with Disabilities Under the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act, 45 VAL. U. L. REV. 595, 602 (2011) (“The IDEA’s individualized
education programs require school districts to provide every disabled child with a
written IEP that caters to the child’s specific educational needs.”).
41. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i) (2006).
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authority over instructional decisions and knowledge about the
general education curriculum and the resources of the district, a
person who can interpret the instructional implications of
evaluation results, other individuals with knowledge or special
expertise regarding the child (including related services’
personnel), and, whenever appropriate, the child. 42 The special
education and related services that the team puts in place have to
be “based on peer-reviewed research to the extent practicable.” 43
The team has to consider a variety of factors when devising the
IEP, including the strengths of the child, the parents’ concerns,
the evaluation results, and the academic, developmental, and
functional needs the child has. 44 When the child has behavior
problems, when the child has limited English proficiency, when
the child is visually impaired, or when the child is deaf or hard of
hearing, additional requirements to consider specific services and
accommodations apply. 45 For all children with disabilities, needs
for assistive technology must be considered. 46
The IEP has been called the “cornerstone of IDEA,” 47 and
that is no exaggeration. The process of creating it, and the final
42. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B).
43. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(IV). Commentators have stressed the importance of this
innovation. See, e.g., Jean B. Crockett & Mitchell L. Yell, Without Data All We Have
Are Assumptions: Revisiting the Meaning of a Free Appropriate Public Education, 37
J.L. & EDUC. 381, 388 (2008) (“The inclusion of this terminology may prove to be
significant to future courts when interpreting the FAPE mandate because the law
directs IEP teams, when developing a student’s IEP, to base the special education
services to be provided on reliable evidence that the program or service works. To
comply with this new requirement, therefore, special education teachers should use
interventions that empirical research has proven to be successful . . . .”); Perry A.
Zirkel, Have the Amendments to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
Razed Rowley and Raised the Substantive Standard for “Free Appropriate Public
Education?” 28 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN L. JUDICIARY 397, 410-15 (2008) (discussing
potential effects of peer-reviewed research provision); Amy D. Quinn, Comment,
Obtaining Tuition Reimbursement for Children with Special Needs, 80 UMKC L.
REV. 1211, 1222 (2012) (“Without this emphasis on peer-reviewed research, special
education in the past was often just a repeat of the curriculum the child with a
disability had already seen in the classroom . . . . Historically, special education
teachers cobbled together their own programs, causing many children to go without
systematic, specialized instruction, which is necessary to receive an appropriate
education.”).
44. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3)(A) (2006).
45. Id. § 1414(d)(3)(B).
46. Id. § 1414(d)(3)(B)(v).
47. Jeffrey A. Knight, Comment, When Close Enough Doesn’t Cut It: Why Courts
Should Want to Steer Clear of Determining What Is—And What Is Not—Material in a
Child’s Individual Education Program, 41 U. TOL. L. REV. 375, 387 (2010).
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document produced, are what put the statutory right to
individualized, appropriate education in the least restrictive
setting into operation. Moreover, the IEP is the basis on which
parents must decide whether to exercise their right to demand a
hearing to challenge the school district’s decisions about how to
educate the child: “At the time the parents must choose whether
to accept the school district recommendation or to place the child
elsewhere, they have only the IEP to rely on, and therefore the
adequacy of the IEP itself creates considerable reliance interests
for the parents.” 48
C. ORIGINS OF THE ALL AREAS AND MEET EACH NEED
PROVISIONS
The assessment in all areas provision was not in the original
Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 49 but
appeared in the first set of regulations from the old Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare interpreting the statutory text.
The regulation required that state and local educational agencies
guarantee that “the child is assessed in all areas related to the
suspected disability, including, where appropriate, heath, vision,
hearing, social and emotional status, general intelligence,
academic performance, communicative status, and motor
abilities.” 50 In a 1997 revision of what had by then been renamed
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, Congress
elevated the regulation’s language to statutory text and edited it
to state that “[e]ach local educational agency shall ensure
that . . . the child is assessed in all areas of suspected
disability.” 51 The provision demanding goals and corresponding
services to meet each of the child’s educational needs appeared
for the first time in the 1997 revision of the statute. 52 That text
48. R.E. v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Educ., 694 F.3d 167, 186 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that
IEPs must be evaluated as of time of drafting, and retrospective testimony about
additional services said to be offered by school district beyond those listed in IEP
should not be considered in tuition reimbursement cases).
49. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975).
50. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.532(f) (1977). The Final Rules added the language, which is
not found in the Proposed Rulemaking at 41 Fed. Reg. 56965-98 (Dec. 30, 1976).
51. Pub. L. No. 105-17 § 101, 111 Stat. 37 (1997).
52. Id. (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(II)-(IV)) (“The term
‘individualized education program’ or ‘IEP’ means a written statement for each child
with a disability . . . that includes— . . . a statement of measurable annual goals,
including benchmarks or short-term objectives, related to—meeting the child’s needs
that result from the child’s disability to enable the child to be involved in and
progress in the general curriculum; and meeting each of the child’s other educational
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The approach Congress took with these amendments was not
to insist on a given level of intensity of services. Instead,
Congress required a certain breadth of services—insisting that
schools look for and find each area of need and put in place
something to address it. Congress seemed to assume that once
schools accurately identified needs and furnished services, the
school personnel’s own professionalism would kick in, and the
services provided would be effective.
III. JUDICIAL APPLICATIONS OF THE ALL AREAS AND
EACH NEED PROVISIONS
Prominent court cases implementing the relevant provisions
of the statute started emerging in significant numbers around the
latter half of the 2000s, especially after 2007. 54 These decisions
needs that result from the child’s disability; [and] a statement of the special
education and related services and supplementary aids and services to be provided to
the child, or on behalf of the child, and a statement of the program modifications or
supports for school personnel that will be provided for the child—to advance
appropriately toward attaining the annual goals . . . .”).
53. The legislative history of the provisions does not do much to amplify the text.
The 1997 Amendments to IDEA included a general revision of the evaluation and
IEP sections, but the specific changes addressed here receive only brief mention in
the House and Senate Reports. See generally H.R. REP. NO. 105-95, at 96 (all areas
of suspected disability), 100-01 (goals and services for each need) (1997); S. REP. NO.
105-17, at 18 (all areas of suspected disability), 20 (goals and services for each need)
(1997).
54. The trend first came to my attention around then and I commented on it for
the first time in an article written in the fall of 2011. See Mark C. Weber, CommonLaw Interpretation of Appropriate Education: The Road Not Taken in Rowley, 41 J.L.
& EDUC. 95, 122-25 (2012). The development followed a period in the late 1990s and
early 2000s in which a large number of disputes arose when parents contended that
their children were eligible for special education services, but school systems
maintained that the students did not meet IDEA’s definition of a child with a
disability. Significant amounts of scholarship on the eligibility topic followed. See,
e.g., Wendy F. Hensel, Sharing the Short Bus: Eligibility and Identity Under the
IDEA, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 1147 (2007); Robert A. Garda, Jr., Who Is Eligible Under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act?, 35 J.L. & EDUC. 291
(2006); Weber, supra note 32; Lois A. Weithorn, Envisioning Second-Order Change in
America’s Responses to Troubled and Troublesome Youth, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1305
(2005). Whether there is a relationship between disputes over schools’ cutbacks on
eligibility in the early 2000s and the disputes over assessment and services litigation
of more recent years remains to be explored. Professor Derek Black, however, has
recently noted that because of information disparities about whether a student’s
learning problems are caused by disability or other factors, school systems may be
better poised to win disputes over eligibility than over failure to provide services.
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provide multiple instances of courts taking school districts to task
for failure to assess children in all areas of suspected disability
and failure to provide IEP goals and services to meet each of the
child’s needs arising from the disability identified in the
assessment.
A. ASSESSMENT IN ALL AREAS
Many cases apply the requirement that children must be
evaluated in all areas of suspected disability. 55 Three examples
demonstrate some of the more common situations in which
violations of the all areas requirement occur. N.B. v. Hellgate
Elementary School District illustrates a delay in conducting a
needed evaluation when the district had reason to know that the
child had a disability and what the disability might be, but failed
to act promptly to evaluate. 56 The court held that a school
Derek W. Black, Civil Rights, Charter Schools, and Lessons to Be Learned, 64 FLA. L.
REV. 1723, 1751 (2012).
55. E.g., Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. D.A., No. 1:11-cv-00320-CWD, 2013
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40794 (D. Idaho Mar. 20, 2013) (affirming hearing officer
determination that evaluation conducted in regimented environment of juvenile
detention failed to satisfy requirement of assessment in all areas of disability
applicable in school setting); Orange Unified Sch. Dist. v. C.K., No. SACV 11–1253
JVS(MLGx), 2012 WL 2478389 (C.D. Cal. June 4, 2012) (holding that school district
unlawfully failed to make timely assessment for autism after parents reported child
displayed autistic-like symptoms, resulting in denial of appropriate education, citing
state analogue of all areas provision); G.D. v. Wissahickon Sch. Dist., 832 F. Supp. 2d
455 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (affirming hearing officer’s determination that reevaluation was
inadequate when it stressed child’s superior cognitive abilities and progress but
failed to incorporate observations about failure of behavior interventions, failed to
make use of classroom observation, did not include functional behavioral analysis,
and included only limited analysis of discrepancy between verbal IQ and memory
and processing speeds); J.G. v. Kiryas Joel Union Free Sch. Dist., 777 F. Supp. 2d
606 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (requiring assistive technology evaluation for child with severe
speech and language deficits); Compton Unified Sch. Dist. v. A.F., No. CV 09-1427
AHM (CWx), 2010 WL 1727674 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2010) (failure to evaluate child for
emotional disturbance); D.B. v. Bedford Cnty. Sch. Bd., 708 F. Supp. 2d 564 (W.D.
Va. 2010) (failure to evaluate student for learning disability); Suggs v. District of
Columbia, 679 F. Supp. 2d 43 (D.D.C. 2010) (denying defendant’s motion for
summary judgment in case alleging school system failed to make needed
evaluations); Blake C. v. Dep’t of Educ., 593 F. Supp. 2d 1199 (D. Haw. 2009)
(holding that school system violated IDEA by failing to perform assistive technology
evaluation); see Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ. v. B.H., Civ. No. 3:07cv189, 2008
WL 4394191 (W.D. N.C. Sept. 24, 2008) (denying motion to dismiss action alleging
prolonged failure to evaluate child for other health impairments or speech-language
and occupational therapy, failure to assess writing, and use of invalid evaluation of
verbal comprehension and perceptual reasoning).
56. 541 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2008). The parents gave the doctor’s report to the
special education director in August, 2003, but in response the district merely
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district violated its duty to assess in all areas by not evaluating a
child for autism after receiving notice from a doctor’s report
submitted by the parents saying that the child might be autistic,
instead referring the parents to a child development center so
they could obtain an assessment on their own. 57 The resulting
delay in obtaining information about the child’s autism meant
that the child did not receive appropriate services until the
following school year; the court held that the parents should
receive reimbursement for costs they incurred supplementing the
child’s education during the year of delay. 58
Another situation is when the child is assessed in some,
perhaps more obvious, areas, but not in every area for which
there is ground to suspect disability. In K.I. v. Montgomery
Public Schools, the court confronted the case of a child with a
congenital condition manifesting itself in multiple joint
contractures, muscle weakness and fibrosis, as well as muscular
dystrophy and restricted breathing capacity. 59 The child was
unable to speak or raise her arms, used a wheelchair for mobility,
needed tube feeding, and had to have periodic suctioning of the
lungs to prevent respiratory problems. 60 Although the school
district provided services to the child at a specialized center for
children with disabilities from as early as 2000 to November of
2004, it never performed a cognitive evaluation, and thus the
school system had “no idea whether K.I. [was] operating in the
normal intelligence range.” 61 Moreover, the child never received
a sufficient evaluation as to assistive technology, so her teacher
could not design a proper communication system for her. 62
“Without a cognitive or assistive technology assessment, MPS
[was] unable to design suitable goals for K.I. And without the
ability to design goals, they [were] unable to develop an adequate

referred the parents to an outside agency for general testing. “Hellgate did not fulfill
its statutory obligations by simply referring C.B.’s parents to the CDC [Missoula
Child Development Center].” 541 F.3d 1202, 1209 (9th Cir. 2008).
57. 541 F.3d 1202, 1209 (9th Cir. 2008).
58. Id. at 1210. Thus the district was guilty of a procedural error that denied the
child appropriate education. See id. The parents did not prevail on a claim regarding
extended school year services. Id. at 1212.
59. 805 F. Supp. 2d 1283, 1287 (M.D. Ala. 2011).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1293. The child did not receive even an occupational therapy
evaluation until the parents secured one in the summer of 2005. Id. at 1288.
62. Id. at 1293.
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IEP.” 63 The court required the district to reevaluate the child and
develop a new IEP. 64
Still another situation in which the all areas regulation has
an impact is when a child is assessed in a specific area, but the
assessment is insufficiently comprehensive within that field.
Dracut School Committee v. Bureau of Special Education Appeals
involved a twenty-year-old student with Asperger’s Syndrome,
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, bipolar disorder, and an
anxiety disorder. 65 The student did well academically in high
school but after leaving school lacked the skills and abilities to
successfully make the transition to college or work,
demonstrating poor personal hygiene, inadequate social relations,
and the inability to succeed in discussion-based college classes
and to navigate any but one bus route in the community. 66 The
court found that the school system failed to make a timely
assessment in the area of post-secondary transition when a full
transition assessment was not made until the spring of the
student’s senior year. 67 Most significantly, the evaluation did not
“provide proper assessments and benchmarks for functional
language pragmatics,” which the student needed for success in
social behavior connected with education, employment, and
independent living after high school. 68 The court awarded a
compensatory education remedy. 69
Failure to assess in all areas of suspected disability is
necessarily linked to the failure to provide services to meet each
of the child’s needs. If the need is never identified, it cannot be
met. Accordingly, courts ordering remedies for failure to assess
require the school district to provide a remedy for failing to meet

63. K.I. v. Montgomery Pub. Schs., 805 F. Supp. 2d 1283, 1293 (M.D. Ala. 2011).
The court said that a district need not evaluate a child in every conceivable area, but
that in this case both cognitive and assistive technology assessments were necessary
to develop appropriate educational goals. Id. at 1293-94.
64. Id. at 1299. The court rejected various other claims put forward by the
parent, including ones based on the obligation to serve in the least restrictive
environment, to provide services at home when the child was absent from school, and
to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 794. Id. at
1296-98.
65. 737 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D. Mass. 2010).
66. Id. at 47.
67. Id. at 50.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 55.
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all the child’s needs resulting from the disability. 70
B. GOALS AND SERVICES TO MEET ALL NEEDS
Courts have found violations of IDEA and ordered relief
when an otherwise beneficial program lacks particular needed
services such as speech therapy, writing programs, behavior
intervention, and post-secondary transition activities. Here the
cases may be broken down into those addressing specific kinds of
needed services. Consider speech: In B.H. v. West Clermont
Board of Education, the court held that the school district denied
a child appropriate education when it failed to consider
independent evaluations showing that the child needed speech
services and when it predetermined that the child did not need
speech services, even though other services were provided. 71
Writing is another relevant area.
Deficiencies in services
addressed to a deficit in writing will support relief, even when
other areas of need are met. 72 Occupational therapy is another
70. See, e.g., N.B. v. Hellgate Elementary Sch. Dist., 541 F.3d 1202, 1210 (9th Cir.
2008) (“[W]ithout evaluative information that C.B. has autism spectrum disorder, it
was not possible for the IEP team to develop a plan reasonably calculated to
provide . . . meaningful educational benefit . . . .”); Bd. of Educ. v. H.A., No. 2:0901318, 2011 WL 861163 (S.D. W. Va. Mar. 9, 2011) (finding that failure to evaluate
behavior and provide services violated appropriate education obligation), aff’d, 445 F.
App’x 660 (4th Cir. 2011); E.S. v. Katonah-Lewisboro Sch. Dist., 742 F. Supp. 2d 417
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (finding program for school year inadequate for failing to account for
progress reflected in qualitative evaluations from past year), aff’d, 487 F. App’x 619
(2d Cir. 2012); District of Columbia v. Bryant-James, 675 F. Supp. 2d 115 (D.D.C.
2009) (holding that IEP was inadequate in failing to address evaluation’s conclusion
that child needed distraction-free environment); Heather D. v. Northampton Area
Sch. Dist., 511 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (finding failure to evaluate child for
behavioral or psychiatric problems led to failure to provide appropriate services).
Courts have also ordered that the evaluations be conducted, e.g., Long v. District of
Columbia, 780 F. Supp. 2d 49 (D.D.C. 2011) (holding that defendant must perform
functional behavior evaluation), and that parents be reimbursed for evaluations they
needed to obtain privately, e.g., JG v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 552 F.3d 786, 795
(9th Cir. 2008).
71. 788 F. Supp. 2d 682 (S.D. Ohio 2011). The school also failed to provide
needed occupational therapy services, id. at 697, and provided ineffective behavioral
services, id. at 699. In another case, the court concluded that the defendant school
system denied a child appropriate education when it failed to include in the child’s
IEP the speech and language services that he needed, apparently because the system
was awaiting a central auditory processing disorder evaluation for the child. I.T. v.
Dep’t of Educ., Civ. No. 11-00676 LEK-KSC, 2012 WL 3985686, at *12 (D. Haw. Sept.
11, 2012) (awarding compensatory education remedy).
72. See Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 56 v. Ms. W, Civ. No. 06-81-B-W, 2007 WL
922252 (D. Me. Mar. 27, 2007) (magistrate judge recommendation) (stating that
school district denied child appropriate education by failing to provide services to
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field in which an IEP will be found insufficient if it fails to meet
an identified need for individual services. 73
Behavioral services are an additional important category. A
number of courts have required a level of adequacy of services
addressed specifically to behavior. For example, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that failure to conduct a
functional behavioral analysis and incorporate a behavior
intervention plan into an IEP for a child with autism called for a
remedy when the child’s behavior impeded her learning, even
though there was evidence her behavior was not atypical for a
child with autism. 74 Another court required in-home behavior
services to be delivered to diminish a child’s self-stimulation and
aggression, and ruled that parent training offered by the school
district was not sufficient, even though the child was provided
extensive applied behavior services in school. 75
address his weakness in writing, though noting that program addressed other
problems), adopted, 2007 WL 1129378 (D. Me. Apr. 16, 2007). But see Klein Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Hovem, 690 F.3d 390 (5th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1600 (2013)
(discussed infra text accompanying notes 85-102).
73. See B.R. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 11 Civ. 8433(JSR), 2012 WL 6691046
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 26, 2012) (in case of nine-year-old with autism, holding that school
department failed to prove that proposed public school placement could meet child’s
need for one-on-one occupational therapy identified by IEP team in light of evidence
that at time of IEP, occupational therapy services were available only in group
setting with six students; ordering reimbursement for private placement).
74. R.E. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 694 F.3d 167, 194 (2d Cir. 2012).
75. New Milford Bd. of Educ. v. C.R., No. 09-328 (JLL), 2010 WL 2571343 (D.N.J.
June 22, 2010), aff’d, 431 F. App’x 157 (3d Cir. 2011). The court relied in part on the
Judge Alito’s gloss on Rowley. See id. at *5. See generally Shore Reg’l High Sch. Bd.
of Educ. v. P.S., 381 F.3d 194, 198 (3d Cir. 2004) (Alito, J.) (“The IEP must be
‘reasonably calculated’ to enable the child to receive ‘meaningful educational benefits’
in light of the child’s ‘intellectual potential.’”) (citations omitted). A number of cases
require specific behavioral services for students with autism, despite the provision of
general programs oriented towards autistic behaviors. E.g., Aaron P. v. Haw. Dep’t
of Educ., 897 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1020-22 (D. Haw. Sept. 17, 2012) (finding denial of
appropriate education when goals on IEP did not address child’s self-injurious
behaviors and other behavior problems, nor child’s communication needs; awarding
reimbursement); Escambia Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Benton, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 126571 (S.D. Ala. 2005); Ind. Area Sch. Dist. v. H.H., No. Civ.A. 04-1696, 2005 WL
3970591, at *8-9 (W.D. Pa. July 25, 2005). Additional cases address other failures to
provide behavioral services when evidence of need exists. E.g., Coventry Pub. Schs. v.
Rachel J., 893 F. Supp. 2d 322(D.R.I. Sept. 28, 2012) (in case of student with ADHD,
oppositional defiance disorder, and severe behavior disorder, holding that failure to
provide clear behavior goals in IEP denied appropriate education even though
student’s grades were acceptable; finding reimbursement for private residential
school to be proper); Council Rock Sch. Dist. v. M.W., No. 11–4824, 2012 WL
3055686, at *7 (E.D. Pa. July 26, 2012) (“As described above, the District was aware
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Post-secondary transition services are another area to which
the courts have devoted attention. As noted above, IEPs must
have plans to address transition for children sixteen and older. 76
Courts have ruled that IEPs violate IDEA when they do not set
out specific services to facilitate the adjustment to post-secondary
experience. Dracut School Committee v. Bureau of Special
Education Appeals, discussed above, found an IEP’s transition
services not to be adequate when the IEP failed to address the
student’s need for pragmatic language skills, vocational skills,
and independent living skills, even though the student did well in
the mainstream in high school and graduated in the top half of
The court stressed that despite the student’s
his class. 77
academic achievement, he never was able to develop the
communication skills and other life skills to attend and
participate effectively in college classes or other activities after
high school. 78
Courts have also rejected IEPs that did not provide parent
training, 79 lacked specific plans to facilitate a child’s transition
from private school to public school and failed to call for adequate
training for a child’s teachers, 80 and neglected to include goals
concerning auditory processing disorder and anxiety and
IEPs have also been found
occupational therapy needs. 81
of M.W.’s behavioral needs, particularly his anxiety, prior to 2009. The school was
also aware of new behavioral issues beginning in 2009. These included stealing,
inappropriate interpersonal interactions, and tantrums. None of these behavioral
needs were addressed in the 2009 IEP.”) (awarding partial tuition reimbursement);
Orange Unified Sch. Dist. v. C.K., No. SACV 11-1253 JVS(MLGx), 2012 WL 2478389
(C.D. Cal. June 4, 2012) (finding that child with autism was denied appropriate
education due to failure to provide needed behavioral therapy and one-on-one
behavioral aide; awarding compensatory and other remedies).
76. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VIII)(aa)-(bb) (2006).
77. 737 F. Supp. 2d 35, 50-53 (D. Mass. 2010).
78. Id. at 47, 52-53.
79. See R.K. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 09-CV-4478 (KAM), 2011 WL 1131492,
at *20-21 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2011) (noting obligation under state law to offer parent
training and counseling services to children with autism and requiring inclusion of
parent training and counseling in IEP; further requiring provision of adequate
speech and language therapy services), adopted, 2011 WL 1131522 (E.D.N.Y. Mar.
28, 2011), aff’d sub nom. R.E. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 694 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2012).
80. Reg’l Sch. Dist. No. 9 Bd. of Educ. v. Mr. P., No. 3:06 CV 01278(CFD), 2009
WL 103376, at *3 (D. Conn. Jan. 12, 2009) (finding program not to be appropriate
due to absence of plan for transition from private to public school, and failure to
require adequate training for child’s teachers and family members, and assessment
of child’s assistive technology needs).
81. C.B. v. Garden Grove Unified Sch. Dist., 655 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1097-98 (C.D.
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insufficient when the goals listed were too vague or not
measurable. 82
IV. THREE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE
DEVELOPMENTS CONCERNING THE ALL AREAS AND
EACH NEED PROVISIONS
There are various ways to look at the recent attention to the
all areas and each need requirements. One would be to fit what
the courts are doing into the context of the Rowley case and the
courts’ understandings of the duty to provide appropriate
education. Is the use of the provisions a limit on Rowley, or a
parallel development regarding parts of the law distinct from the
appropriate education term, or some combination of the two? A
second would be to fit the development into the duty to provide
education, to the maximum extent, with children who are not
disabled, and the requirement to provide aids and services to
achieve that inclusion. A third would be to view the attention to
the all areas and each need provisions as a simple reaction to
steps that school districts have taken to curtail evaluations and
services in response to hard budgetary times. These explanations
are not mutually inconsistent, and taking them in turn may give
a clearer understanding of how the all areas and each need
provisions ought to be applied consistently with Congress’s
intentions.
A. ENFORCEMENT OF IDEA BEYOND ROWLEY
Rowley made no reference to the assessment in all areas
language of the regulations, and of course could not have
discussed the language about meeting each of the child’s
educational needs that Congress was not to adopt for another
fifteen years. That omission is significant, for it might be possible
to interpret Rowley to permit a school to ignore one or another
Cal. 2009), aff’d, 635 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 500 (2011); see
also Sch. Bd. of Norfolk v. Brown, 769 F. Supp. 2d 928, 935, 943 (E.D. Va. 2010)
(finding IDEA child-find obligation violation in case of child whose IEP lacked any
behavioral goals or objectives).
82. See, e.g., Woods v. Northport Pub. Sch., No. 1:09-cv-243, 2011 WL 1230813, at
*15-16 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2011) (stating that IEP lacked adequate information
about present level of functioning and criteria to measure progress), aff’d in part &
vacated in part on other grounds, 487 F. App’x 968 (6th Cir. 2012); see also M.H. v.
N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 685 F.3d 217, 248-49 (2d Cir. 2012) (rejecting IEP with short
term objectives lacking evaluative procedures and containing goals not tailored to
child’s unique needs).
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area of need, as long as the program as a whole confers some
benefit on the child. But by compelling school districts to make
an assessment in every area where disability is suspected, and
then by requiring them to provide services to meet each
educational need identified, the current version of the statute
rules out that reading. Courts accordingly have forced schools to
evaluate in all suspected areas and provide services that confer
some benefit to a child with a disability in all identified areas.
They have resisted letting schools by with claiming they have
provided an amorphous “some benefit” from the educational
program as a whole.
Giving credit to the all areas and each need provisions is not
an assault on Rowley. It is simply following congressional
commands that relate to the other, more recently revised,
portions of the statute. Even an expansive interpretation of
Rowley may be reconciled with giving those sections of the law
the credit they are due. Schools have to determine and address
all needs, even if they need to meet only a level of adequacy with
regard to the specific services given. Rowley might be given due
credit in that regard, but the issue in the all areas and each need
cases actually is one that was not considered in Rowley—in that
case each of the child’s needs was being addressed, just not with
the intensity the parents wanted. This understanding of the all
areas and each need provisions dovetails with the Rowley opinion
itself, which emphasized the importance of the IEP and the
procedural safeguards around its creation. 83
That being said, it should be noted that other developments
over the years have helped render Rowley less central to the
special education inquiry, even without pushing it entirely out of
the picture. With regard to just one example, several astute
commentators have pointed out that the movement to standardsbased education has displaced the centrality of the vague somebenefit standard, as well as Rowley’s highly manipulable measure
of passing from grade to grade for children with disabilities who
are in general education classrooms. 84
83. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 203, 205-06 & n.27.
84. See Amy J. Goetz et al., The Devolution of the Rowley Standard in the Eighth
Circuit: Protecting the Right to a Free and Appropriate Public Education by
Advocating for Standards-Based IEPs, 34 HAMLINE L. REV. 503, 530 (2011) (“The
Rowley standard has not been raised, but the legal measure of ‘some educational
benefit’ today differs significantly from the measure in 1982. Where achievement of
passing marks and advancement from grade to grade were the markers at the time
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There is an exception to the general trend regarding the
interpretation of the all areas and each need language of IDEA.
One recent court of appeals’ decision, Klein Independent School
District v. Hovem, 85 takes Rowley beyond its limits and commits
the error of reading the all areas and each need provisions out of
the statute. 86 In Klein Independent, the district court held that
the school district failed to adequately remediate a highly
intelligent high schooler’s identified weakness in the area of
writing. 87 He passed his classes, the district court found, by
obtaining assistance from his mother and brother on his
homework and by being given other informal accommodations. 88
The district court held that the student’s transition plan was not
individualized and lacked result-oriented goals and identification
Rowley was decided, attainment of state educational standards must now become the
measure in this era of standards-based reform.”); Scott F. Johnson, Reexamining
Rowley: A New Focus in Special Education Law, 2003 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 561, 577
(2003) (“Incorporating state educational content and proficiency standards into the
statutory definition of FAPE [free, appropriate public education] means high
expectations must now be included in disabled students’ IEPs. Educational
standards define performance criteria for students that school districts and parents
must use when developing goals and objectives in a student’s IEP.”); Maureen A.
MacFarlane, The Shifting Floor of Educational Opportunity: The Impact of
Educational Reform on Rowley, 41 J. L & EDUC. 45, 68 (2012) (“[A] state’s
educational standards reflect the level of adequacy expected in public education for
all students and, therefore, [the level of adequacy] is likely to impact the educational
discussion as to expected growth and outcome for special education students even if a
higher outcome standard is not express in the IDEA.”). A source has also suggested
that the threat of loss of federal funding from failure to achieve adequate yearly
progress under the No Child Left Behind initiative has the effect of raising special
education standards. See Andrea Kayne Kaufman & Even Blewett, When Good Is No
Longer Good Enough: How the High Stakes Nature of the No Child Left Behind Act
Supplanted the Rowley Definition of a Free Appropriate Public Education, 41 J.L. &
EDUC. 5, 17 (2012) (“After NCLB [No Child Left Behind], it seemed plausible that
while a school could provide ‘sufficient’ services to pass the FAPE threshold
established in Rowley, it may still face the threat of reduced or withheld federal
funds for not showing adequate academic progress for students with disabilities. In
many cases, NCLB’s threat of withholding funding or closing schools provides more
compliance and a better education than enforcement of IDEA.”).
85. 690 F.3d 390 (5th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1600 (2013).
86. Cf. Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 837 (1988)
(“As our cases have noted in the past, we are hesitant to adopt an interpretation of a
congressional enactment which renders superfluous another portion of that same
law.”) (collecting cases) (footnote omitted).
87. Klein Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Hovem, 745 F. Supp. 2d 700, 753 (S.D. Tex. 2010),
rev’d, 690 F.3d 390 (5th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1600 (2013). The court of
appeals also noted that the school district’s IEPs provided some individualized
accommodations. 690 F.3d at 392-93.
88. 745 F. Supp. 2d at 750.
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of needed services. 89 The court of appeals reversed, stressing that
overall educational benefit, rather than the remediation of the
child’s disability, is decisive under Rowley, and concluding that
the child’s IEPs were sufficient because they were reasonably
calculated to enable him to achieve passing marks and advance
from grade to grade. 90
In contrast to the appellate opinion in Klein Independent, the
cases described above apply the all areas and each need
provisions so as to give them independent meaning, not balancing
a specific failure to evaluate disabilities and meet needs against a
general educational benefit. As the district court in Klein
Independent said, responding to the argument ultimately adopted
by the court of appeals:
[Under IDEA,] [t]he focus is on the special education services’
targeting the student’s disability and/or weakness, not his
normal abilities or strengths. The FAPE [free, appropriate
public education] must provide educational instruction
designed to meet the disabled child’s unique needs, supported
by services necessary for the child to benefit from the
instruction. [The district] appears to turn that standard on
its head in arguing that because [the student] did well in all
other areas than that in which his disability lies, his IEP was
adequate even though it was not designed nor modified when
shown to be ineffective to focus on that unique
weakness/need. 91

The dissenting judge in the court of appeals put the matter
more bluntly:
The approach taken by the majority undermines the
rehabilitative purpose of the IDEA by treating individualized
education as an afterthought. The majority invites school
districts to forgo measured, individualized mainstreaming of
special needs students—a laudable goal under the IDEA—in
favor of social promotion of disabled students unprepared for
the difficult and sometimes harsh world that awaits them
after high school graduation.92
89. Klein Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Hovem, 745 F. Supp. 2d 700, 751 (S.D. Tex. 2010),
rev’d, 690 F.3d 390 (5th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1600 (2013).
90. Klein Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Hovem, 690 F.3d 390, 397 (5th Cir. 2012), cert.
denied, 133 S. Ct. 1600 (2013).
91. 745 F. Supp. 2d at 749.
92. 690 F.3d at 409 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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Other courts apply the all areas and each need provisions
correctly in the face of the arguments advanced in Klein
Independent. 93
The majority opinion in Klein Independent is an outlier.
Some prominent cases that might be thought to align with the
decision turn out on closer examination not do so. Houston
Independent School District v. Bobby R. stated that “it is not
necessary for [a child] to improve in every area to obtain an
educational benefit,” and rejected the parents’ IDEA claim even
though some parts of the IEP, notably a particular phonics
program, were not fully implemented. 94 But the decision in the
case rested on the fact that the school district offered
compensatory services to make up for the implementation
problem; the court relied on the quite distinct principle that de
minimis failures in IEP implementation do not support a remedy
when the child makes educational progress in the area the
missing services would have addressed. 95 Nor does R.P. v. Alamo
Heights Independent School District96 undermine the conclusion
that all areas of suspected disability must be assessed and
addressed. The court in that case held that a child’s IEP was not
sufficiently individualized because a school district delayed
conducting an assistive technology evaluation so that it was not
93. Another case dealing with writing is W.H. v. Clovis Unified School District,
No. CV F 08-0374 LJO DLB, 2009 WL 1605356 (E.D. Cal. June 8, 2009), stay denied,
2009 WL 2959849 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2009), judgment withdrawn in part, 2009 WL
5197215 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2009), which ruled that a failure to assess a child in
writing “including determining all aspects of Student’s difficulty with written
expression, deprived Student of educational benefits,” id. at *18, despite the
conclusion by the administrative law judge that the child was progressing
academically in the general education classroom, id. at *22. Maine School
Administrative District No. 56 v. Ms. W., Civ. No. 06-81-B-W, 2007 WL 922252 (D.
Me. Mar. 27, 2007) (magistrate judge recommendation), adopted, 2007 WL 1129378
(D. Me. Apr. 16, 2007), found an IDEA violation and affirmed a partial tuition
reimbursement award when a school district “essentially ignore[d] [the child’s] more
pronounced deficits in writing skills,” 2007 WL 922252, at *10, though it provided
reading skills services and evidence indicated that the child made substantial
academic and behavioral gains during the relevant time period. Additional relevant
cases include: Long v. District of Columbia, 780 F. Supp. 2d 49, 60-61 (D.D.C. 2011)
(stressing IEP requirement to consider strategies to address behavior and noting
deterioration of child’s behavior); Sch. Bd. v. Brown, 769 F. Supp. 2d 928, 943-44
(E.D. Va. 2010) (finding IDEA violation in failure to implement positive behavioral
interventions and supports, preventing child from achieving educational benefit).
94. 200 F.3d 341, 350 (5th Cir. 2000).
95. See id. at 349-50.
96. 703 F.3d 801 (5th Cir. 2012).
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considered until the time for planning for the following school
year. 97 The court nevertheless upheld the refusal to order any
relief, because the child “demonstrated positive academic and
non-academic benefits from her use of AT [assistive technology]
devices” during the relevant period. 98 Thus the court never
denied that IDEA required assessment in all areas, nor did it
permit an overall educational benefit to outweigh the failure to
meet specific needs. Instead, the court found that the child made
educational progress in the exact area where the assessment was
deficient, and so the parents did not establish an actionable harm
caused by the failure to assess. 99 Finally, D.K. v. Abington School
District, 100 a case rejecting claims about delays in assessing a
child in his early years of primary education, might be thought to
diminish the reach of the requirement to evaluate in all areas of
suspected disability, but the case goes off on issues regarding the
statute of limitations, 101 and the essential holding on the issue of
delay is that the school was justified in not suspecting the child of
a disability at the time the parents argued it had a basis for
suspicion. 102
The bottom line is that the courts applying the all areas and
each needs provisions as independent requirements that have to
be met irrespective of Rowley have it right and that Klein
Independent has it wrong. The other courts are enforcing IDEA
in line with statutory text and congressional intentions;
moreover, the opinions that might seem to support Klein
97. R.P. v. Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist., 703 F.3d 801, 813 (5th Cir. 2012).
98. Id. at 814.
99. The court further held that the child was well behaved, and the district did
not violate IDEA by failing to conduct a functional behavioral assessment, instead
basing a behavior plan on observations, review of records, and data analysis. Id. at
813. Hence there was no failure to assess in an area of suspected disability with
regard to behavior. A behavior plan may in fact have been unnecessary, but that is
beside the point for the present discussion.
100. 696 F.3d 233 (3d Cir. 2012).
101. See id. at 244-48.
102. Id. at 251-52 (“We are also unpersuaded that the School District violated its
Child Find obligations by failing to suspect D.K. of a disability after the April 2006
evaluation based on further misconduct and additional opinions by his parents and
private therapist . . . . [S]chools need not rush to judgment or immediately evaluate
every student exhibiting below-average capabilities, especially at a time when young
children are developing at different speeds and acclimating to the school
environment.”). The court conceded that once grounds for suspicion exist, “a poorly
designed and ineffective round of testing does not satisfy a school’s Child Find
obligations.” Id. at 250.
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Independent do not.
B. A NEW APPROACH FOR AN ERA OF INCLUSION
An implementation of special education law that goes beyond
Rowley is not the only way to look at the all areas and each need
provisions. The approach that Congress used in 1997 and that
the courts have applied more recently fits well with the
increasing attention to the problem of how to make education in
mainstream environments work. From the very beginning, the
federal special education law concerned itself with avoiding the
problem of educators obsessing over diagnoses and shunting
children into diagnosis-related programs isolated from the
general education classroom. 103 But integration requires more
than just a legal command to educate children in the least
restrictive environment. Gradually, educators and lawmakers
realized that the way to enable children with disabilities to
succeed in general education was to identify specific areas of
cognitive, social, or other need, and meet those needs with
targeted interventions. 104 Once their individual needs were
addressed, the children could take their place in general
education classes with everyone else. 105 The message is one of
support and accommodation, special education as a bundle of
services to assist children rather than special education as a place
to put children.
Although the law stressed the importance of education in the
mainstream from the very beginning, the trend line shows a
greater emphasis on the issue from the inception of the special
education law to the adoption of the all areas and each need
provisions, with courts displaying a greater recognition that
enhanced individualized services are what is needed to make
mainstream education of children with disabilities successful. In
the 1990s, two cases from the courts of appeals elaborated on the
close connection between less restrictive settings and supportive
103. See Mark C. Weber, A Nuanced Approach to the Disability Integration
Presumption, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 174, 179 (2007) (collecting sources).
104. As Congress recognized in the 2004 revision of IDEA, the interventions did
not necessarily have to be called special education, and might be used to prevent a
child from ever having to receive a special education designation. See Mark C.
Weber, Reflections on the New Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement
Act, 58 FLA. L. REV. 7, 22-23 (2006) (describing early intervening services).
105. This development came with some prodding from the courts. See cases cited
infra text accompanying notes 106-11.
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services. In Sacramento City Unified School District v. Rachel H.,
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit required the placement
of a child with an intellectual disability in a full-time regular
education program with the help of a part-time aide and other
assistance. 106 The court adopted a test that looked to the
educational benefits available to a child in a general education
classroom, “supplemented with appropriate aids and services,” in
comparison to “educational benefits of a special education
classroom.” 107 In Oberti v. Board of Education, the Third Circuit
required a school district to include a child with Down Syndrome
The court admitted that
in a mainstream class. 108
mainstreaming had previously been unsuccessful for the child,
but noted that no supplemental aids and services had been
provided during that trial. 109 Evidence indicated that the child
could succeed if given the help of an itinerant special education
instructor, special education training for the regular education
teacher, modifications of the curriculum, parallel instruction, and
part-time resource room services. 110 The court said:
One of our principal tasks in this case is to provide standards
for determining when a school’s decision to . . . place [a] child
in a segregated environment violates IDEA’s presumption in
favor of mainstreaming. This issue is particularly difficult in
light of the apparent tension within the Act between the
strong preference for mainstreaming and the requirement
that schools provide individualized programs tailored to the
specific needs of each disabled child.
The key to resolving this tension appears to lie in the school’s
proper use of ‘supplementary aids and services’ . . . . 111

These cases were not the only ones of their era regarding the
least restrictive environment obligation, and in a number of
instances, school district opponents of inclusive placements
prevailed. 112 Nevertheless, by 1997, one prominent writer asked
the question “Is the Era of Judicially-Ordered Inclusion Over?”
106. 14 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994).
107. Id. at 1400.
108. 995 F.2d 1204 (3d Cir. 1993).
109. Id. at 1223.
110. Id. at 1222.
111. Id. at 1214 (citations and footnote omitted).
112. See, e.g., Hartmann v. Loudoun Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 118 F.3d 996 (4th Cir.
1997); Briggs v. Bd. of Educ., 882 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1989); Lachman v. Ill. State Bd. of
Educ., 852 F.2d 290 (7th Cir. 1988).
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and after reviewing the case law concluded:
There is no indication from the recent litigation that the
courts will retreat from the emphasis they have placed on the
IDEA’s LRE provision in the past few years. Before school
officials can make the decision to exclude a student with
disabilities from the mainstream, they must have either
made a legitimate attempt at inclusion, and failed in spite of
their best efforts, or have substantial evidence that inclusion
will not work. Furthermore, the effort to include a child
within the regular education mainstream must be genuine;
window dressing will not suffice.113

The drafters of the 1997 Amendments linked the adoption of
the assessment in all areas provision to the goal of enabling
children to succeed in the mainstream:
The amendments in section 614(b) are designed to link
evaluation procedures and instructional programming . . . . It
is the committee’s intent that all tests given to children must
be linked to the general education curriculum to which the
child is exposed and that each test must provide information
that directly assists in the process of instructional
programming. 114

This passage reinforces the basic point that if the school
district does not identify the specific weaknesses (not just the
general diagnosis) of the child, it cannot target the services to
accomplish the child’s integration with nondisabled children.
A major innovation in the 1997 Amendments was the
revision and recodification of the requirements pertaining to
IEPs, and these changes, including the each need provision, acted
to facilitate children’s success in the mainstream by means of
tailored services. One such requirement was that a regular
education teacher be a member of the IEP team whenever a child
with a disability would be served in the regular education
classroom, so the team would have the information it needed to
identify services the child would need to learn in that setting. 115
113. Allan G. Osborne, Jr., Is the Era of Judicially-Ordered Inclusion Over?, 114
ED. LAW REP. 1011, 1025 (1997).
114. S. REP. NO. 104-275, at 48-49 (1996).
115. Pub. L. No. 105-17, § 101 (1997) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §
1414(d)(1)(B)(ii) (2006)); see S. REP. NO. 104-275, at 49; see also 20 U.S.C. §
1414(d)(3)(C) (2006) (“A regular education teacher of the child, as a member of the
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Another provision demanded that an IEP describe how the
disability affects the child’s progress in the general education
curriculum so that any obstacles to success in the mainstream
could be addressed. 116 Thus, the assessment in all areas of
suspected disability and meet each need provisions are part and
parcel of the effort to enable children to succeed more readily in
inclusive settings. 117
Various aspects of the 1997 Amendments to IDEA other than
the evaluation and IEP provisions also fit well with the
increasing emphasis on additional services to make
mainstreaming succeed. One example is a provision that stated
that a child need not be classified under any specific disability
category as long as the child meets the eligibility requirements of
This statutory term, which codified existing
the Act. 118
IEP Team, shall, to the extent appropriate, participate in the development of the IEP
of the child, including the determination of appropriate positive behavioral
interventions and supports, and other strategies, and the determination of
supplementary aids and services, program modifications, and support for school
personnel . . . .”) (adopted in 1997 Amendments).
116. Pub. L. No. 105-17, § 101 (1997) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §
1414(d)(1)(A)(i) (2006)); see S. REP. NO. 104-275, at 50 (“The provisions on “Content of
IEP’s” in redesignated section 614(e) have been revised to make the IEP a more
useful document that places greater emphasis on educational results for children
with disabilities and on ensuring that each eligible child, as appropriate, has the
opportunity to progress in the general education curriculum and to participate with
nondisabled children in various settings.”). This provision overlaps in part with the
meet-all-needs requirement that is central to the discussion in this Article. 20 U.S.C.
§ 1414(d)(1)(A)(ii) (2006).
117. See Stacey Gordon, Making Sense of the Inclusion Debate Under IDEA, 2006
BYU EDUC. & L.J. 189, 215 (2006) (stating, “The 1997 Amendments continued to
emphasize the importance of inclusion with a focus on the least restrictive
environment requirement,” and commenting that congressional supporters of 1997
changes and President Clinton stressed importance of inclusion and access to regular
education curriculum). Ms. Gordon goes on to suggest that the 2004 Amendments
moved away from an emphasis on individualized services by stressing school- and
district-wide accountability measures. Id. at 216. But accountability and progress
for children with disabilities in the aggregate need not be inconsistent with
individualized services to enable them to achieve in general education settings. In
fact, it is difficult to imagine that students could be able to demonstrate proficiency
at grade-appropriate levels unless they are exposed to the general education
curriculum with their peers and have adequate supportive services to make that
exposure effective. As Ms. Gordon notes, the highly-qualified-teacher provisions of
the 2004 Amendments could have the effect of promoting inclusion and development
of more inclusive teaching methods, although she seems to question whether the
development is necessarily a good thing. Id. at 221.
118. Pub. L. No. 105-17, § 101 (1997) (“Nothing in this Act requires that children
be classified by their disability so long as each child who has a disability listed in
section 602 and who, by reason of that disability, needs special education and related
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Department of Education policy, illustrates the movement away
from decisions about services and placement driven by rigid
disability-category determinations towards viewing special
education as a group of services tailored to the child’s individual
needs in settings not determined by diagnosis. 119
The 1997 Amendments also required that the state’s formula
for funding special education not create incentives to placement
in more restrictive settings. The provision reads:
If the State uses a funding mechanism by which the State
distributes State funds on the basis of the type of setting in
which a child is served, the funding mechanism [must] not
result in placements that violate the requirements of
subparagraph (A) [the provision requiring education of
children with disabilities with nondisabled children to
maximum extent appropriate]. 120

In discussing this provision and the least restrictive
environment duty in general, the Senate Committee specifically
addressed the relationship between placement in the mainstream
and the provision of additional services:
[I]f a child with a disability has behavioral problems that are
so disruptive in a regular classroom that the education of
other students is significantly impaired, the needs of the
student with a disability cannot be met in that environment.
However, before making such a determination, school
districts must ensure that consideration has been given to
the full range of supplementary aids and services that could
be provided to the student or to the teacher in the regular
educational environment to accommodate the unique needs of
the child with a disability. 121

The emphasis on inclusion has grown even stronger in the
period after the 1997 Amendments to IDEA, and that reality may
help account for the increasing prominence of the all-areas
services is regarded as a child with a disability under this part.”) (codified at 20
U.S.C. § 1412(a)( 3)(B) (2006)).
119. S. REP. NO. 104-275, at 38 (1996).
120. Pub. L. No. 105-17, § 101 (1997) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §
1412(a)(5)(B)(i) (2006)).
121. S. REP. NO. 104-275, at 38-39 (1996). The Committee also stressed the
requirement that states take action so that minority children would not be placed in
overly restrictive settings. Id. at 39; see 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(6)(B) (2006).
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provisions in the recent IDEA case law. In 2002, the President’s
Commission on Excellence in Special Education issued a report
declaring that “[c]hildren placed in special education are general
education children first . . . . General education and special
education share responsibilities for children with disabilities.
They are not separate at any level—cost, instruction, or even
identification.” 122 In the amendments to IDEA in 2004, Congress
acted on this declaration by adding provisions to implement
testing of the achievement of children in special education using
learning standards based on the general education curriculum. 123
Empirical studies show that more and more children with
disabilities are being educated in mainstream settings with
supportive services. 124 Summarizing data from the National
Center for Education Statistics, one source noted:
[M]ore students with disabilities are being integrated into
general education classrooms. For instance, in 1989, less
than 32% of special education students between the ages of
six and twenty-one spent 20% or less of their class time in
segregated special education classrooms. In contrast, by
2008, 58% of special education students spent 20% or less in
segregated classrooms. Furthermore, in 1989, nearly 25% of
special education students spent more than 60% of the school
day in segregated classrooms; in 2008, only 15% of special
education students spent more than 60% of their day in
segregated classrooms or facilities.125

An interpretation of the all areas and each need
developments that emphasizes the increasing importance of
educational achievement in mainstream settings is quite
122. PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON EXCELLENCE IN SPECIAL EDUCATION, A NEW
ERA: REVITALIZING SPECIAL EDUCATION FOR CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES 7
(2002).
123. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(16) (2006) (governing participation in assessment by
children with disabilities).
124. To the distress of some observers. See, e.g., Ruth Colker, The Disability
Integration Presumption: Thirty Years Later, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 789 (2006); Anne
Proffitt Dupre, Disability and the Public Schools: The Case Against “Inclusion,” 72
WASH. L. REV. 775 (1997); Megan Roberts, The Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act: Why Considering Individuals One at a Time Creates Untenable
Situations for Students and Educators, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1041 (2008).
125. Mark T. Keaney, Examining Teacher Attitudes Toward Integration: Important
Considerations for Legislatures, Courts, and Schools, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 827, 830
(2012) (interpreting data from United States Department of Education National
Center for Education Statistics).
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compatible with an interpretation that views the case law as a
means to enforce IDEA that does not run up against Rowley’s
limits on appropriate education. More than a decade ago, it was
clear that courts were interpreting the least restrictive
environment obligation as a positive command to provide services
to facilitate inclusive education and were ruling that the services
required could exceed the floor of opportunity established in
Rowley. 126 After comparing the lax appropriate education cases
that follow Rowley with the more demanding cases that interpret
the least restrictive environment duty, one recent observer
concluded, “As a consequence of these decisions, courts balancing
FAPE [free, appropriate public education] and LRE [least
restrictive environment] employ a lop-sided standard: whereas
integration must be absolutely maximized, the actual education
provided need only satisfy the ‘basic floor’ of an adequate
educational opportunity.” 127
C. A RESPONSE TO RECESSION-ERA CUTBACKS
Still another, more pedestrian, way to look at the increased
attention to the all areas provisions is to view parents’ and courts’
reliance on them as defensive. It is no secret that school districts
suffering from the decline in tax revenues from the economic
downturn after 2007 have curtailed special education, 128
including specialized assessments and therapies, 129 particularly
those provided by costly professionals. 130 The contraction is part
of a general cutback in public education funding during the same
126. Mark C. Weber, The Least Restrictive Environment Obligation as an
Entitlement to Educational Services, 5 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 147, 149-51,
153-55 (2001) (collecting cases).
127. Caroline Jackson, Note, The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act and
Its Impact on the Deaf Community, 6 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 355, 364 (2010).
128. See Michael A. Rebell, Safeguarding the Right to a Sound Basic Education in
Times of Fiscal Constraint, 75 ALB. L. REV. 1855, 1930 (2012) (discussing New York
Regents’ elimination of previous requirement of minimum of 30 to 60 minutes of
daily language services for children with autism).
129. See id. at 1930 n.324 (“Other special education mandate relief measures that
the Regents are proposing include repealing the current requirements that boards of
education have plans and policies for declassification of students with disabilities,
that a psychologist determine whether there is a need to administer an individual
psychological evaluation in all cases, that parents have a right to choose the
preschool evaluators, and that the preschool evaluation timeline be extended from
thirty days to sixty days.”).
130. See id. at 1930-31 (discussing proposals to limit role of psychologists to
eligibility determinations and eliminate right of parent to have physician on IEP
team).
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time period. 131 Federal stimulus money cushioned the impact of
the shortfalls for a while, but school administrators held back
from making long-term commitments to personnel or programs
because the additional federal funding was temporary. 132
When school districts skimp on specialized assessments and
services to meet individual needs, parents can be expected to
resist by exercising rights to due process hearings. Eventually
many of those disputes wind up in court, with school districts
spending money on lawyers to defend their refusal to spend
money on assessments and services. If the parents prevail, the
districts must spend money to pay for the parents’ lawyers as
131. See Kristi L. Bowman, Before School Districts Go Broke: A Proposal for
Federal Reform, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 895, 905-06 (2011) (“State and local governments
usually lag behind the private sector by a year or two in feeling the effects of a
recession and having to cut their budgets, but even by now it is old news that most
school districts have been cutting back—postponing orders for new equipment and
textbooks, cutting programs such as arts and athletics. However, the cuts stretch
beyond regular belt-tightening: at least two-thirds of school districts laid-off teachers
and staff for the 2009–2010 school year and between seventy-five and ninety percent
of school districts expected to do so before or during the 2010–2011 school year.
Because of the second round of stimulus funding, the number of teachers laid-off in
fall 2010 did not reach the 100,000-300,000 previously predicted, but 60,000 teachers
still lost their jobs. As a result, almost two-thirds of school districts expected that
they would be consolidating most students into larger classes by fall 2010.”)
(footnotes omitted); see also Black, supra note 54, at 1747 (“The 2008 financial crisis
placed immense pressure on state and local budgets. Some localities were nearly
insolvent, and the rest faced ‘the biggest cutbacks they’ve seen in decades.’ Only the
influx of $53.6 billion in federal stimulus and emergency aid avoided educational
catastrophe during the last two years. With no more aid readily forthcoming, school
districts have been fully confronting the harsh reality of falling state revenues that
required staggering budget cuts. Thirty-four states and the District Columbia have
already made enormous cuts to public schools, some approaching one billion
dollars.”) (footnotes omitted); Rebell, supra note 128, at 1857 (“Extensive reductions
in state and local funding for public education since the economic downturn that
began in 2008 have resulted in substantial cutbacks in educational services . . . .”).
132. See Lisa Fine, Title I, Spec. Ed. Aid Casts Long Stimulus Shadow, EDUC.
WEEK (Feb. 5, 2010), http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2010/02/10/21mtr_stimspeced.h29.html?qs=and+recession+special_education (“Programs serving the
nation’s economically disadvantaged students and those with disabilities are
receiving massive funding boosts through the federal stimulus package—$13 billion
for Title I aid and $11.3 billion for special education—but how school districts choose
to use the money may set them up for problems when it dries up.”); Christina A.
Samuels, Spec. Ed. Stimulus Money Raising Cautions, EDUC. WEEK (Mar. 16, 2009),
http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2009/03/18/25idea_ep.h28.html?qs=and+recession
+special_education (“Though grateful for the largess, school leaders face restrictions
with that money. The rules governing the use of federal special education money
mean that it’s unwise for districts to use the added funding to start new programs or
hire new teachers.”).
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well. 133 In those cases in which the parents prevail, the courts
recognize the reality that the districts have failed to assess
children in all areas of suspected disability and to furnish
services to address each need.
If the economy recovers, and states and localities see their
tax revenues rise, it is possible that school districts will be more
willing to make fully comprehensive evaluations and commit to
goals and services to meet each of the needs identified. Thus, the
problem may decline and the litigation disappear or at least
diminish. An economic expansion over the next few years may
provide a natural experiment to demonstrate whether the
resource-constraint interpretation is correct. 134
CONCLUSION
Perhaps no single explanation suffices for the recent
attention courts have paid to the all areas and each need
provisions. There is reason to view the development as salutary,
however.
Congress enacted the all areas and each needs
provisions consciously, for a reason. By making school districts
discover and address the specific obstacles that are keeping
children from making educational progress in all areas, and not
just requiring the minimum children need to skate by into the
next grade, courts are enforcing IDEA as written and expanding
educational opportunity as Congress demanded. By requiring the
assessments and services that the children need to make that
advancement in inclusive settings with their nondisabled peers,
again the courts are enforcing both the letter and the spirit of the
current law. And by resisting creation of a budget-shortfall
exception that the law nowhere provides, courts that apply the all
133. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I) (2006) (providing for attorneys’ fees for
parents who prevail in hearings or court).
134. This view may be unduly optimistic. At the time of writing, media reports
indicate that the sequester of federal funds will cause—once again—the reduction of
available special education services. See, e.g., Motoko Rich, Teacher Layoffs, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 26, 2013, available at 2013 WLNR 4831290 (discussing reaction of one
director of student services to impending automatic federal spending cuts, “Mr.
Lambert said he feared that he would have to raise student-teacher ratios in classes
for students with cognitive delays or autism.”); see also Cameron Brenchley,
Sequestration Would Hurt Students, Teachers, and Schools, THE OFFICIAL BLOG OF
THE
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
EDUC.
(Feb.
25,
2013),
http://www.ed.gov/blog/2013/02/sequestration-would-hurt-students-teachers-andschools/ (detailing reductions in federal special education funding totaling $600
million, requiring states and school districts to cover cost of about 7,200 teachers and
other staff nationally).
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areas and each need provisions as written further the underlying
goals of guaranteeing appropriate education and inclusion that
Congress had in enacting IDEA.

